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Humanising Sociological Knowledge  
Marcus Morgan, University of Cambridge 
 
This paper elaborates on the value of a humanistic approach to the production and 
judgement of sociological knowledge by defending this approach against some common 
criticisms. It argues that humanising sociological knowledge not only lends an appropriate 
epistemological humility to the discipline, but also encourages productive knowledge 
development by suggesting that a certain irreverence to what is considered known is far 
more important for generating useful new perspectives on social phenomena than defensive 
vindications of existing knowledge. It also suggests that the threat of what is called 
“relativism” evoked by critics of humanised conceptions of knowledge is largely illusory, 
and that in fact a far graver danger comes from dogmatic assertions of social truth that 
claim to have somehow secured access to non-contingent arenas of knowing, forestalling 
ongoing conversation, and tying future discovery to the limits of current perspectives.  
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Humanistic Knowledge 
To confuse our own constructions and inventions with eternal laws or divine decrees is one of the most 
fatal delusions of men 
- Isiah Berlin, 1980: 303. 
 
Concepts are, as Wittgenstein taught us, uses of words. Philosophers have long wanted to understand 
concepts, but the point is to change them so as to make them serve our purposes better 
- Richard Rorty, 2000a: 25. 
 
After Comte, Durkheim was perhaps the most concerned of the classical 
sociologists with establishing the discipline on a scientific footing. As part of achieving 
this objective, he advanced a critique of William James’s pragmatic account of truth, 
widely—and this paper suggests, quite fittingly—known at the time under the name 
“humanism” (e.g. Schiller 1907). Since James never responded to Durkheim’s critique, 
this paper begins with a long-overdue defence of the value of his theory of knowledge to 
the discipline of sociology.  
In 1914 Durkheim delivered a course of lectures at the Sorbonne intended to 
educate his students, including his son Andre ́, in a then relatively new form of 
philosophy hailing from across the Atlantic. Though by no means unsympathetic to 
pragmatism, and in fact willing to identify certain affinities between James’s position and 
his own, Durkheim still saw pragmatism as presenting a threat to the sociological 
positivism he endorsed by mischievously undermining our intuitive understanding of the 
objective solidity of truth. Though he was careful not to treat the kinds of truth that might 
be acquired by disciplines such as sociology as “something absolute and extra-human”, 
he nevertheless believed that social truth was “something that in a certain respect 
imposes itself on us”, claiming that pragmatism left us with a misleading picture of truth 
as failing to “correspond to something real” (Durkheim 1983, 68). Whilst he accepted 
pragmatism’s claims that truth is developed and enlarged within social contexts, he 
believed that this under- standing, by itself, failed to make sense of the intuition that our 
arrival at the truth helped “satisfy” our goal of getting in touch with reality (ibid., 56). He 
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saw pragmatism’s claim that truth was ultimately a “utilitarian” concept—an accolade we 
simply accord to knowledge that works—as dangerous in its robbing truth of its “hard”, 
necessary, and constraining qualities. Such an account contradicted his own claims in 
The Rules of Sociological Method ([1895] 1982) that sociology’s task was to establish 
so-called “social facts”, such as the patterning of suicide or crime rates, which compelled 
and constrained actors within society and existed objectively on a social plane, beyond 
their isolated manifestations. Sociology was properly a science aimed at gathering such 
“social facts” and demonstrating the structured relationships that existed between them.  
There are, however, serious problems not only with Durkheim’s positivistic 
conception of sociology, but also with his reifying “social facts” as things existing 
independently of their own construction. As Baert and de Silva, put it, “any reference to 
‘social reality’ begs the question: social reality under which interpretative framework? 
Any allusion to observational social ‘facts’ begs the question: facts under which 
interpretative scheme?” (2010, 291; Becker 2007, 12). Observation and description is 
inescapably “theory-laden” (Hanson 1970) and in positing objective “social facts” 
Durkheim commits the fallacy of mistaking his own particular linguistic and conceptual 
sorting-frame for the social world for that world’s own inherent vocabulary. In other 
words, he falls into a type of concept fetishism that treats analytical constructions as 
independent objects whose actual genesis and manufacture is in effect concealed. 
Moreover, Durkheim’s critique implicitly rested upon carving out an impossibly 
dislocated and impartial vantage-point from which the sociologist might discern “social 
facts”, therefore providing an example of what Dewey dubbed the “spectator theory of 
knowledge”. Dewey believed that this “spectator theory of knowledge” had plagued 
epistemological accounts of truth throughout philosophy’s history and was problematic 
not only in its deceptive reliance on what Nagel (1986) has more recently called a “view 
from nowhere”, but more importantly (in terms of advancing his own argument) in its 
cutting “truth” off from the human needs and purposes it invariably serves. Neglecting 
these needs and purposes of human knowledge allows for a slippage into a reified 
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conception of truth as an objective thing existing “out there”, as opposed to the pragmatic 
conception of it as a process that, as James put it, “happens to an idea” (James [1907] 
1981, 92). James’s discussion of truth proposed that what we understood to be true was 
inseparable from the utility that our designation of its truth entailed. If an idea is said to 
be true, James suggested, we must ask “what experiences will be different from those 
which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth’s” cash-value in 
experiential terms?’ ([1907] 1981, 92). Adopting this humaistic account of truth within 
sociology entails understanding the aspiration of sociological research not as an attempt 
at convergence on a singular underlying reality, but rather—like in all other forms of 
human culture—as a set of particular, historically-contingent attempts by human beings 
to deal effectively with their environment and the problems it poses. “True” sociological 
knowledge therefore obtains its “cash-value” not from some timeless epistemological 
validity, but from its ability to deal well with the problems we humans ask it to in the 
particular historical contexts in which we do so. Though most contemporary sociological 
epistemology has moved beyond Durkheim’s positivistic conception, the “spectator 
theory of knowledge” often remains implicit in the still-very-present methodological 
drive to secure “valid” forms of social data. In order to explain more fully this paper’s 
argument for the utility of substituting this “spectator theory of knowledge” with a 
humanistic one, two important elements of the latter must first be explained.  
 
Coherence & Justification as the Actual Goals of Truth-seeking Social Knowledge  
 
Traditions are the context of any truth  
Weeks 1991, 162.  
 
As we have seen, Durkheim’s critique of pragmatism appealed to the intuition that 
truth is something that “imposes itself on us” (1983, 75). From the perspective of a 
humanised account of knowledge, this claim ignores the obvious fact that all knowledge, 
and perhaps especially that gleaned within the disciplines of the “hard sciences” 
Published in Social Epistemology 
(particularly during periods of what Kuhn calls “normal science”), is interpreted in light 
of its coherence with existing knowledge. Another way of putting this is that “what 
counts as a truth is a function of the rest of your beliefs” (Rorty 1989, 172). New 
evidence does not simply “impose itself on us”, but is instead made sense of on the basis 
of what has been learnt by the accretion of old knowledge. To be considered true, new 
knowledge needs to “hang-together” with other things considered true in the past, and 
when compelling new truths arise that fail to cohere with our past beliefs, not only are 
they often at first ridiculed through a defence of orthodoxy (such as occurred with 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory), but their capacity to “impose themselves on us” is only 
successful as a function of their ability to cohere better than our past beliefs did with 
other aspects of our current beliefs and experiences. As James put it, “ideas ... become 
true just insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our 
experience,” truth inheres in ideas that are able to “carry us prosperously from any one 
part of our experience to any other part” (James [1907] 1981, 30, his emphasis). “New 
truth”, he continues, “is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions, it marries 
old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity” 
(ibid., 31). Durkheim’s account not only fails to do justice to this requirement of 
coherence for truth-seeking knowledge however, but also inadequately addresses another 
essential requirement: its ability to be justified.  
Whilst the appeal to evidence itself is a definite and scientifically 
systematised form of justification, the criterion of inter-subjective justification (or 
“warrant”, as Dewey expressed it) is especially important in humanistic terms since 
justification is a process that demands a human audience: we always justify to some 
other. As Becker puts it, “facts are facts only when they are accepted as such by the 
people to whom facts are relevant” (2007, 12). Further, we justify differently to different 
audiences so there can be no perfect singular justification fit for all possible audiences, 
because audiences and the justifications they require, change from one place to another 
and from one point in time to another; a matter that holds as much for scientific truth as 
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it does for any other (e.g. Shapin 1994). In terms of sociology, as Becker writes, “when 
we make a report about society, we make it to some- body. And who those somebodies 
are affects how we present what we know and how users react to what we present to 
them” (2007, 13). Importantly, in disciplines such as sociology, such justification need 
not only rely upon or address the disembodied resources of abstract reason. Justification 
also concerns the embodied, emotive, and normative means through which human beings 
reach conviction concerning knowledge and is therefore not simply synonymous with 
“logic”, “rationality”, or “pure consciousness”, singularly and abstractly defined.1 
From this perspective, the claim that there is some ultimate decontextualised use 
to which we might put truth is the equivalent of suggesting that there are two distinct 
ends of enquiry: one end that attempts to justify one’s beliefs to a particular human 
audience, and another which aims to justify these beliefs to all possible audiences (or to 
the world itself, whatever that might mean). The problem with this, as Rorty points out, is 
that “pragmatists do not know how to imagine or how to discover the bounds of 
possibility” (2000, 11). The notion of “whether we are understanding a justification as a 
‘justification for us’ or as a ‘justification, period’” is equivalent to “trying to tell whether 
I think of my scalpel or my computer as ‘a good tool for this task’ or as a ‘good tool, 
period’” (ibid., 13). A computer may be a perfect tool for the sociologist wishing to write 
up the findings of her latest piece of research, but quite useless for the surgeon engaged 
in removing a tumour. Uses are specific to ends, and no human concept, not even “truth”, 
can be said to be useful per se, for all possible ends. The consequence of this for 
sociology is that, as Becker puts it, we should see “every way of representing social 
reality as perfect—for something” (2007, 17).  
Acquiring justification and acquiring true beliefs are therefore, in practice, 
indistinguishable from one another. Or rather, whereas we can recognise when a belief 
has been adequately justified to a given audience, we have no comparable way of 
recognising when a belief has been proven to be definitively and eternally true: we have 
no way of knowing when we have reached the ultimate end of a given enquiry. We might 
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therefore say that in practice “truth” is used as imprecise shorthand for what is always in 
fact contingent justification. When this shorthand function goes unacknowledged, “truth” 
has a tendency to become reified as a fixed entity (rather than a grounded human process) 
that “logic”, “reason”, “method” or some other apparently neutral technique might reveal 
to us. Because knowing whether we have arrived at truth is always ultimately 
unrecognisable, whereas knowing whether our knowledge claims have been shown to be 
coherent with the rest of our beliefs, and adequately justified to a relevant community on 
the basis of that community’s criteria for justification is recognisable, pragmatists 
therefore suggest we give up the search for the illusive former, and instead focus our 
energy on the latter. In other words, focus on justifying our beliefs to (or testing them 
against) concrete audiences, the breadth and diversity of which we might forever 
endeavour to expand; a process which may, or may not, involve the marshalling of 
empirical evidence.  
 
The Human Being as the Missing Element  
From what has been said, we might now recognise that the element missing from 
Durkheim’s account of sociological truth is the same element that has more recently been 
self-consciously excised from many sociological epistemologies—the human being. 
Whilst, for example, on the one hand many post-structuralist accounts of truth have 
criticised realist epistemology by revealing the ways in which truth is tied to power (e.g. 
Foucault 1977, 1978), they have, like the realists they oppose, refused to stabilise truth 
with the only creatures for whom the concept might itself hold meaning, significance, or 
utility: human beings themselves.2 On the other hand however, critical realists and neo-
positivists have rejected the anti-realist presentation of truth as a function of power but 
have tended to do so by appealing to a form of objectivity that can itself only be arrived 
at through a deliberate attempt at eliminating the subjective, human point of view. What 
separates the humanistic alternative from these accounts is the insistence on truth as 
being necessarily dependent upon—in terms of serving a purpose exclusively for—the 
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human, rather than the non-human world.  
On this point, Brandom, a former student of Rorty’s, has claimed that Rorty’s 
“biggest idea is that the next progressive step in the development of understanding of 
things and of ourselves is to do for epistemology what the first phase of the 
Enlightenment did for religion” (2000, xi; McDowell, 2000, 109). Rorty understood the 
Enlightenment to have left us with only an immature and partial form of humanism, a 
humanism that had merely replaced theological absolutes with meta- physical absolutes, 
such as “truth” and “reason”. Just as the pre-Enlightenment world had been mistaken in 
gazing to the heavens for meaning, Rorty believed that the post-Enlightenment world 
was equally mistaken in understanding itself as aimed towards intrinsic reality; a culture 
directed towards gaining eternal knowledge of things. Rorty tried to persuade his readers 
that human culture was better seen as a form of “edification” aimed at redescribing the 
world in more useful, constructive, or in James’s ([1907] 1981, 100) terminology, 
“expedient”, ways. He therefore understood the dispute over realism as boiling down to 
“the question of whether, in our pursuit of the truth, we must answer only to our fellow 
human beings, or also to something non-human, such as the Way Things Really Are In 
Themselves” (Rorty 2002, 13).  
This position has received plenty of criticism, both from pragmatists intent on 
recuperating some of the apparent security of realism (e.g. Bernstein 2010; Habermas 
2003; Putnam 1990), as well as from non-pragmatists who see it as a form of 
irresponsible irrationalism (e.g. Benson and Stangroom 2006; Bhaskar 1989; Blackburn 
2006; Williams 2002). The most common charge shared between the various critiques 
has been that a fully humanised account of truth invites a reckless and pernicious 
relativism into our understanding of knowledge. The following section defends against 
this accusation as it is found in one of its most comprehensive expressions: Bernard 
Williams’s (2002) book Truth and Truthfulness.  
 
The Illusory Threat of “Relativism”  
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We philosophers who are accused of not having sufficient respect for objective truth—the ones 
whom the materialist metaphysicians like to call “postmodern relativists”—think of objectivity 
as intersubjectivity.  
Rorty 2004, 21  
 
In comparison to other critics who charge Rorty with relativism—Putnam, for 
example, describes Rorty’s position as “industrial strength cultural relativism” (2004, 
121)—Williams’s critique is interesting in its claim to itself be in some sense humanistic, 
describing his own genealogy of the term “truth” as “an exercise in human self-
understanding ... into human concerns with the truth” (2002, 60–61). Williams divides 
the range of opinion into those he calls the “deniers”, which includes both pragmatists 
and post-structuralists, and “the party of common sense”, which includes, amongst 
others, unsurprisingly, himself. The main charge made against the former camp is 
“relativism”, and that endorsing relativism is logically paradoxical because it ipso facto 
relativises the relativists’ own claims. He argues, for example, that Rorty “naively treats 
his own self-discourse as standing outside the general philosophical situation he is 
describing” (Williams 1983, 12), and therefore joins the rest of the deniers in “pecking 
into the dust the only tree that will support them” (Williams 2002, 19).  
The problem with this criticism is that it relies upon the mistaken assumption that 
Rorty’s pragmatism presents another philosophical theory of truth; another attempt at 
epistemology. Rorty himself, however, understood his approach as a resolutely anti-
epistemological form of practice rather than theory, to be judged on its own terms by 
assessing its utility in helping us resolve, or more commonly (along- side the mature 
Wittgenstein) dissolve, the problems it addresses. He wrote that “epistemology as a 
philosophical discipline has been a complete flop”, and that he “would hesitate to 
recommend a further dose of it” (Rorty 2000a, 112). On his own understanding, Rorty 
remains consistent with his own loose suggestions; uninterested in providing an account 
of the “truth” of his approach to settling philosophical problems, merely its utility, or 
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“expediency”; proposing something equivalent to “try it, it works”.  
If we accept this, the threat of “relativism”, as conceived by Williams, itself 
becomes “largely an imaginary bugbear” (Rorty 2002, 17) around which a collection of 
insecurities and fears have arisen. It is a “bugbear” because nobody actually holds what 
Williams and the rest of the accusers consider to be relativist views; that is, nobody 
actually holds the opinion “that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any 
topic, is as good as every other ... that two incompatible opinions on an important topic 
are equally good” (Rorty 1982, 166).3 As Edward Said puts it, although “we are right to 
bewail the disappearance of a consensus on what constitutes objectivity, we are not by 
the same token completely adrift in self-indulgent subjectivity” (Said 1994, 98). As 
applied to social scientific research, the point is that we don’t need to resort to absolute 
conceptions of validity in order to be able to assert that one way of interpreting research 
findings may be better than others (e.g. Flyvbjerg 2001). “Relativism”, in this way of 
thinking, then becomes cast as a sensationalist and pejorative term deployed by realists in 
order to discredit what has for far longer in the history of philosophy been more respect- 
fully referred to as “scepticism”.4 A sceptical, as opposed to a “relativist” approach to 
notions of truth, doesn’t hold the maddening view that any belief is equally as good as 
any other, but simply advises moderation in the confidence with which we project our 
current beliefs, which have served us for a finite period of time, into an unknown and 
infinite future.  
Rorty suggests that the “philosophers who get called ‘relativists’” are not those 
who have no means of distinguishing between more or less justified opinions, but “those 
who say that the grounds for choosing between such opinions are less algorithmic than 
had been thought” (1982, 166). Williams, in contrast, claims that “some methods of 
inquiry are truth-acquiring” (2002, 127) but that the problem with specifying particular 
“truth-acquiring” methods can only be answered, for each specific set of propositions, 
through metaphysics and epistemology. In sociology this might be the equivalent of 
claiming that observing proper method paves the golden path to truth. This, however, 
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again proves inadequate as a critique of pragmatism because it is precisely the notion that 
the truth-acquiring methods of epistemology and metaphysics can somehow sit outside of 
history whilst the rest of human culture is trapped within it that pragmatists wish to 
reject. Metaphysicians and epistemologists form their own human communities, and sub-
communities, just as sociological methodologists do, and it is clear from all the 
disputes within and between such communities that easy consensus is far from the norm. 
Bernstein writes that “standards of argument and justification have changed in ways that 
no scientist or philosopher might have anticipated” (2010, 114) so that what are 
considered ideal epistemic conditions on closer examination usually turn out to be a 
universalisation of those conditions considered ideal locally, and at present. Not only this, 
but, if “theory” is taken to be a dominant means through which we assess knowledge, as 
Abend (2008) has demonstrated, different conceptions of the meaning and usage of 
“theory” coexist simultaneously within sociological research. What’s more, “the 
procedures we use for justifying beliefs to one another are among the things we try to 
justify to one another” (Rorty 2002, 15), so no ultimate and eternal procedure for 
evaluating our different forms of justification can therefore be expected, and the beliefs 
we currently take to be true might therefore better be seen as those that prove most useful 
in meeting the needs we currently ask of knowledge to meet.5  
Whilst the conventional interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, his discussion 
of “humble truths”, and his having written such things as “there are no eternal facts, nor 
are there any absolute truths” ([1878] 1984, 15) would have him placed as a “denier” in 
Williams’s schema, Williams himself marshals Nietzsche in support of his own account 
of truth. He does so in two particular ways. Firstly, he claims that “although Nietzsche 
was keenly alive to what concerns the deniers” (2002, 18), ultimately he cannot be 
counted among their ranks for he recognised that “various beliefs may be necessary for 
our life, but that [this did] not show them to be true” (ibid., 15). The problem with 
employing Nietzsche in this first manner however, is that it treats beliefs as if they were 
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isolated, but in actual contexts of knowledge-production, this is never the case. In actual 
historical contexts, truth-seeking beliefs have to compete with one another for 
justification, and it is the most justified belief that wins the prize of truth-ascription, even 
if other beliefs may be considered justified when examined in isolation. Trapped as we 
are in the parochialism of our finite human condition, one can never know if one has 
included all possible beliefs (or pieces of evidence), and therefore truth-ascription can 
only ever be considered provisional, never eternal. From this perspective, Nietzsche’s 
insight that the justification and necessity of holding a belief is not equivalent to that 
belief’s ultimate truth appears compatible, not contrary, to a pragmatic account. Further, 
pragmatists accept a practical and “cautionary” use of the word “truth”, which applies to 
those cases in which we wish to “contrast less informed with better informed audiences, 
past audiences with future audiences” (Rorty 2000b, 4). In these particular cases, Rorty 
contends, the word “truth” can be useful, but the need for a philosophical theory of the 
nature of “truth” employed in this cautionary manner is as lacking as the need for a 
philosophical theory of the nature of the word “Danger!” employed in an everyday 
context.  
Secondly, Williams makes use of Nietzsche in adopting his genealogical method 
to trace back both real and imagined histories of truth and truthfulness. Problematically 
though, he claims that his “genealogical story aims to give a decent pedigree to truth and 
truthfulness” (Williams 2002, 19) even though there is no a priori reason to expect from 
the outset a genealogical investigation to legitimate one’s research object. Williams in 
fact acknowledges this problem elsewhere in writing that though philosophy “must 
concern itself with the history of our conceptions”, it “must overcome the need to think 
that this history should ideally be vindicatory” (Williams 2006, 182). Nevertheless, his 
genealogy traces back what he argues are the twin “virtues” of truth; “accuracy” and 
“sincerity”, which arose from the need to regulate the relating of knowledge between 
different individuals. Accuracy became a virtue because the “positional advantage” of a 
speaker meant that they could “tell someone else about a situation because he is or was in 
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it, while his hearer is not or was not” (2002, 42), and  
because reflective creatures will have the opportunity within this structure for deceit and 
concealment, they will also have the motives for them, as when a hunter has found prey 
which he would rather keep for himself and his immediate family. (ibid., 44)  
Sincerity, on the other hand, involves guarding against the temptation to lie and is 
likewise understood as a virtue because to acquire it one must struggle to over- come 
both “inner” and “outer” obstacles to achieving truth and because it also “operates in a 
space that is structured by motivations to conceal and dissimulate” (ibid., 124).  
In tracing back these genealogies, Williams claims he is demonstrating not merely 
the usefulness, but rather the “intrinsic value” of truth and truthfulness (2002, 90–95). 
However, on closer examination, as the pragmatists suggest, it proves impossible to 
unpick the one from the other, and it is indeed difficult to see how this would not be the 
case considering that a genealogical method presupposes the disruption of essential 
qualities. Take for example the following quotes:  
promises and assertions could become worthless if the respective institutions were 
overwhelmed with defaulting behaviour. (86, emphasis added)  
The power of imaginary genealogies lies in introducing the idea of function where you 
would not expect to find it, and explaining in more primitive terms what that function is. 
(32, emphasis added)  
[accuracy and sincerity] are useful, indeed essential, to such objectives as the pooling of 
information, and those objectives are important to almost every human purpose. (57, 
emphasis added)  
The real and imagined genealogies Williams traces seem to go no further than 
demonstrating, alongside the pragmatists he critiques, the use of truth and truthfulness. 
Where he claims to be taking the further step of demonstrating their “intrinsic value” this 
always seems to be through either forceful assertion or rhetorical appeal to common 
sense, rather than through genealogy itself. An example of the former technique:  
The concept of truth itself—that is to say the quite basic role that truth plays in 5 relation 
to language, meaning, and belief—is not culturally various, but always and everywhere 
the same. (ibid., 61)  
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and an example of the latter:  
most people do think, in some way or other, that these qualities [truth and truthfulness] 
have a more than instrumental value (the pragmatists do, out of school). (ibid., 60)  
If we ignore the assertions and rhetorical appeals to common sense (a matter 
dealt with in greater detail below), Williams’s genealogy seems surprisingly 
compatible with a pragmatic view upon truth, and indeed, as Putnam notes, expresses 
“views surprisingly similar in certain respects to Rorty”s’ (2004, 122). This is not only in 
the sense that it goes no further than arguing for the usefulness of truth and truthfulness 
but also in the sense that in almost all of Williams’s passages, the terms “accurate” or 
“sincere” could easily be substituted with the term “justified” with- out substantially 
harming their meaning or insight.  
For example, when Williams asks the rhetorical question “if you do not really 
believe in truth, what is the passion for truthfulness for? Or—as we might also put it—in 
pursuing truthfulness, what are you supposedly being true to?” (2002, 2), there seems no 
logical barrier in Williams’s argument to simply answering, “justification” and 
“coherence”. When he (again, rhetorically) suggests that truth distinguishes between “the 
force which is argument, and the force which is not—differences such as that between 
listening and being hit, a contrast that may vanish in the seminar but which reappears 
sharply when you are hit” (ibid, 9), his point of distinguishing between coercion and 
conviction would lose none of its power or perception if he had instead written that “an 
argument has more justification than a punch”, not more truth. No substantial difference 
can be found if we compare for example Williams’s statement that “the assessment of 
beliefs and assertions as true is a favourable one” (ibid., 84) with Rorty’s claim that 
assessing truth is the equivalent of giving a “pat on the back” to assertions that “pay their 
way” (Rorty 1982, xxi, xxv).  
Williams claims that 
it seems not to occur to them that even if the ideal of discovering and telling the truth 
were in themselves illusions, if the idea of “the truth” were itself empty, those illusions 
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might well play a vital part in our identifying and pursuing those objectives. (2002, 59)  
This is a perplexing charge though, considering that the notion of truth-as-a-
motivator is precisely a pragmatic conception of truth. By extension Williams also seems 
mistaken in suggesting that scientific advance would screech to a dramatic halt if 
scientists were themselves to adopt a pragmatic account of truth, hence, so he argues, 
falsifying pragmatism on its own terms. In response, we might ask why anyone would 
cease any useful practice that was allowing them to achieve what they wished? Almost all 
of the Metaphysical Club (the cradle of American pragmatism), including of course 
Peirce and James, were themselves accomplished scientists attempting to bring the 
practical, empirical-experimental approach of science into what they saw as (at the time) 
the overly idealist discipline of philosophy.6 As Bernstein puts it, “Peirce, Dewey and 
even James ... sought to imbue philosophy with what they took to be the openness of the 
scientific experimental spirit” (1983, 205). The revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin, and 
Einstein only serve as the most dramatic examples of why most sophisticated scientists 
resist the temptation of claiming that current scientific theories will hold eternally. Most 
would instead claim that such theories work; that they fit the current evidence, 
successfully cohere with everything else we currently know about the world, and 
therefore require no modification until they can be shown to fail to cohere with some 
other justified and coherent theory, or fail to fit some newfound piece of evidence and 
therefore lose their prior ability to be justified. Contrary to Williams’s critique, 
experimental scientific practice seems to be an inherently pragmatic practice, one that 
gets by perfectly well without the help of metaphysical notions of “truth” shoring it up.  
 
Epistemological Scaremongering  
Perhaps the most misleading aspect of the critique of a humanised approach to 
knowledge production however, is the claim that it presents a deep cultural and political 
danger that threatens to undermine Enlightenment common sense with a malignant form 
of sophistry. Williams again subscribes to this position, seeing Rorty’s questioning of 
correspondence theories of truth as “unsettling”, and as presenting a threat that not only 
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“has consequences for real politics,” but also “signals the danger that our intellectual 
activities, particularly in the humanities, may tear themselves to pieces” (2002, 2). He 
adds that “to the extent that we lose a sense of the value of truth, we shall certainly lose 
something and may well lose everything” (ibid., 7). Such remarks echo both Durkheim’s 
earlier warnings that the “problem raised by pragmatism is indeed of a very serious 
nature” (Durkheim, 1983, 1), and from a very different perspective, Horkheimer’s similar 
characterisation of pragmatism as a prime exemplar of the “eclipse of reason” ([1947] 
2004, 29–39).  
The cultural conservatism evinced here massively overestimates the risk, whilst 
simultaneously ignoring the gains, that open philosophical debate over the nature of truth 
poses (Morgan, 2015). Not only are these critiques based upon a misunderstanding of 
pragmatism (pace Williams, of all the philosophies, pragmatism in fact reveals, rather 
than “loses” the “value of truth”), but also, as was mentioned above, they neglect the fact 
that in practical everyday life, in sociology as elsewhere, the use of the word “truth” 
usually functions perfectly well in achieving what it needs to, without the need for 
philosophical epistemologies, or analytic accounts of its meaning as a predicate we 
ascribe to certain statements we make.7 The irony of this kind of epistemological 
scaremongering is that it ignores the far more realistic danger that affirmative assertions 
of timeless truth play in human affairs. In other words, it ignores the authoritarianism 
inherent in any drive towards eradicating a healthy questioning of received wisdom, a 
questioning that in fact celebrates, through practice, the virtue of critique. This 
questioning is an activity to which sociology contributes a crucial role, and which ought 
in liberal societies to be protected and applauded as a method of renovating our ideas and 
perspectives so as to defend against their fossilising into dogma. Dogmatic pronounce-
 ments of truth (or the method of arriving at it) can function to put an end to critique 
through claiming that the last word has been said on a particular matter, and as Bernstein 
writes, “any good pragmatist knows, nobody has the final word” (2010, 124). If 
questioning the utility of the vocabularies we currently use to make sense of the world 
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were to stop, then so too would intellectual progress, and this would present a much 
greater danger to human culture and the advance of ideas than the meek suggestion of 
adopting a more modest position than the reverence that realists presently pay to the 
notion of “truth”. Jacob Bronowski—hardly someone to rail against the scientific 
approach of the Enlightenment—even suggested that the appeal to, and forcible 
imposition of “absolute knowledge” is a defining characteristic of totalitarian societies; 
that societies that promote singular, indomitable versions of the truth characteristically 
fail to bring their own—all-too-frequently murderous—premises into question 
(Bronowski 1973, 374). In certain passages Williams in fact senses this danger himself, 
writing that during “the twentieth century we were much reminded of the destructive 
capacities that the Enlightenment has deployed, with its aspiration to social management 
as applied scientific truth” (2002, 231), but sadly fails to extend this acknowledgement 
into the need for a more open, criticisable, and in fact far less dangerous humanistic 
account of knowledge.  
The following section draws upon Wittgenstein to defend against a final common 
criticism of a humanised account of truth: the charge that it denies self- evident everyday 
truths. 
 
Against the Charge of Denying “Everyday Truths”  
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again “I know that that’s a 
tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: 
“This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy”. 
 Wittgenstein 1975, 61. 
 
Though Wittgenstein is not conventionally identified with pragmatism, his shared 
fascination with human experience, religion, and the elevation of practice over theory has 
not gone unnoticed (e.g. Goodman 2002; Haack 1982; Rorty 1961). Further, Wittgenstein 
was, throughout his life, a strong admirer of William James, often citing The Varieties of 
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Religious Experience and Principles of Psychology as amongst his favourite books, the 
latter being “for some time, the only philosophical work to be found on his bookshelves” 
(Haack 1982, 163). Following Rorty’s suggestion that “the closer one brings pragmatism 
to the writings of the later Wittgenstein ... the more light they shed on each other” (1961, 
198–199), this section examines how the mature Wittgenstein’s understanding of truth 
shared a deep affinity with the pragmatic one and can therefore be used to defend against 
the criticism that pragmatism leads one to a denial of unquestionable “everyday truths”.  
Wittgenstein discussed matters of truth most explicitly nearer the end of his life in 
the collection of notes that were posthumously published as On Certainty (1975), and in 
which he makes the remark that he is “trying to say something that sounds like 
pragmatism” (1975, 106). These notes were mainly written in response to G. E. Moore’s 
criticisms of scepticism, and deal with the kind of “everyday truths” (such as “here is a 
hand” said holding one’s hand up) that are often given as examples of why sceptical (let 
alone so-called “relativist”) approaches to truth must be flawed. Though Wittgenstein’s 
actual interlocutor was Moore, in his assertion that “everyday truths can readily and 
reasonably be counted as facts” (Williams 2002, 11), Williams could easily stand in as a 
more contemporary defen- der of Moore’s position.  
It is important to recognise that neither the later Wittgenstein nor the pragmatists 
argued against the notion that everyday truths ought to be treated any differently than we 
currently treat them in everyday life; both thought that language was generally used very 
effectively in practical lived life, and were instead interested in how philosophers became 
misled by ignoring language’s use by instead looking for the essences to which language 
was assumed to correspond. Rejecting this search for essences, Wittgenstein suggested 
that in looking for the meaning of words such as “truth”, we should instead examine the 
ways in which such words are used within “forms of life”, and avoid confusing what he 
called “grammatical” uses of words for the world’s material being. For example, he 
argued that Moore’s claim that “I know that that is a tree”, said whilst standing in front of 
the tree, was not a meaningful statement about the way in which the world materially is, 
but instead a “grammatical” statement which serves to explain how the word “tree” is 
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conventionally used within our language (i.e. “the word tree refers to this object before 
me”). When a sceptic challenges the claim “I know that that is a tree” said whilst 
standing if front of the tree, Wittgenstein argues she cannot be bringing the existence of 
the tree into question, but is instead making a nonsensical use of language. The claim 
should not, in other words, be treated as an invalid empirical hypothesis about the 
material world, but rather as a misuse of the conventions of language, and therefore the 
debate between sceptics and realists over everyday truths misses the point as long as it is 
conceived as a matter of arguing over empirical hypotheses.8 As he put it, when a 
statement about everyday reality begins with “I know ...”,  
If “I know etc.”, is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the “I” cannot be 
important. And it properly means “There is no such thing as a doubt in this case” or “The 
expression ‘I do not know’ makes no sense in this case”.  (Wittgenstein 1975, 18). 
Wittgenstein’s stress upon language as a human creation allowing us to deal 
with the world as we find it, not a creation of that undivided and unlabelled world itself, 
is very similar to that of the pragmatists. The pragmatist-inspired philosopher of social 
science, Patrick Baert, for instance, points out that although Darwinian naturalism allows 
us to understand how language evolved as a sophisticated means of dealing with our 
environment and hence surviving in it long enough to pass on our genetic information, 
“it is difficult to see how human beings would have acquired the capacity to represent 
the universe as it actually is. It would,” he writes, “in light of biological evolution, be an 
extraordinary coincidence if people’s cognitive functions were so radically transformed 
as to allow for adequate representation” (2005, 129). In Habermas’s eulogy to Rorty he 
likewise reiterates that we “cannot describe nature in a language we assume to be nature’s 
own language” (Habermas 2008). However, where Wittgenstein takes us further than the 
pragmatists is in his demonstration of language as the framework within which truth or 
falsity can be made sense of. This framework can be neither justfied (by the realist) nor 
put into question (by the sceptic) without making nonsensical uses of the language we use 
to do so, because the linguistic framework forms the limit within which justification or 
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questioning of such statements is able to take place. As he put it, “we never arrive at 
fundamental propositions in the course of our investigations; we get to the boundary of 
language which stops us from asking further questions” (Wittgenstein, 1980, 35). 
Wittgenstein’s insights suggest that the reason epistemologists continually 
make the mistake of understanding words such as “truth” as representing something 
unconditional and sublime is because they have been artificially abstracted from the 
worldly contexts in which they are used. Within these contexts, pragmatists argue that 
“truth” is usually used to refer to justified and coherent knowledge. The therapeutic 
element of Wittgenstein’s work consists in alleviating the psychological unease 
surrounding philosophical disputes over particular conceptual ideas by returning the 
words involved to their practical contexts and in the process dissolving the misguided 
philosophical problems surrounding them.9  
 
This paper has issued a warning against adopting a metaphysics of realism in 
disciplines like sociology and defended the value of a humanised account of knowledge 
against some of its most common complaints. It has argued that whilst sociologists might 
assess matters of coherence and justification, they have no equivalent way of knowing 
whether they hold some eternal knowledge about the world. “Truth”, it has therefore 
argued, ought to be seen as an appreciative term we award to knowledge that meets our 
subjective need to deal with the world that surrounds us; in Baert’s tidy formulation, it is 
about “coping with”, not “copying”, reality (2005, 104). Against the charge that this 
understanding leads to a pernicious relativism, it has argued that a greater threat to the 
advance of knowledge in fact comes from dogmatic assertions of social truth understood 
in absolute and eternal terms.  
One implication of this paper is that adopting a humanistic account of socio-
 logical knowledge may allow the discipline to recognise an element of its value in its 
capacity to question, disrupt, and critique on the one hand, the scientific pretence to 
offering ultimate truths about social life, and on the other, those uncritical “common 
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sense” truths—“common to a particular period and a particular common environment” 
(Gramsci 1971, 330f)—that make no claim to science yet nevertheless silently and 
powerfully sway social opinion. To the extent to which its approach to knowledge is 
humanised therefore, this paper implies that part of sociology’s value lies in its ability to 
contribute to the project of moulding forms of critical “good sense” out of the uncritical 
forms of “common sense” that circu- late throughout society. It also suggests a move 
away from debates over whether sociological descriptions accurately reflect social reality 
towards asking whether the modifications that such accounts make to our current 
vocabularies of description or explanation prove useful, and because use is always 
relative to ends elsewhere defined, this in turn places a greater emphasis on 
understanding what sociology’s ends might be.  
 
.  [1]  Ihde (2009) offers one way of combining the phenomenological features that stem from 
our embodied experience of being-in-the-world with pragmatism’s concern for 
knowledge as an interaction between ourselves and our environment. Whilst this paper 
agrees with Ihde that embodiment moulds our experience and knowledge in particular 
and often shared directions, and in addition that technological developments are altering 
these interactions between ourselves and our environments in interesting new ways, it 
does not see this as necessarily requiring the replacement of more classically conceived 
notions of “subjectivity”.   
. [2]  This is of course a consequence of their suspicion towards humanism more generally, 
summed up in their concern with “displacing the subject”.   
. [3]  Margolis (1988) offers an alternative defence of so-called “relativism”.   
. [4]  The obvious difference between Cartesian and pragmatic scepticism is that Descartes was 
 interested in how universal doubt might uncover, rather than unsettle, ultimate truths.   
. [5]  Whitley (1984) demonstrates how justification of the procedures used to arrive at 
knowledge varies not only over time, but of course also across specific areas of scientific 
knowledge, organised as much on a social, as on an intellectual basis.   
. [6]  Peirce, it should however be noted, would no doubt have raised his own strong objections 
Published in Social Epistemology 
 to the arguments put forward here.   
.  [7]  It is for this reason that this paper has ignored ongoing debates in analytic philosophy, 
stemming from the work of philosophers such as Tarski and Carnap, over the definition 
of truth in “formal” or “artificial” languages.   
. [8]  As was noted above, this could be similarly applicable to the charge of relativism—one 
cannot sensibly hold such views: no (sane) relativist in fact exists.   
. [9]  Marcuse ([1964] 2002, 174–205) critiques this apparent therapeutic function of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy by arguing that it reinforces conventional understandings of 
the use of language, therefore disregarding possibilities of “transcendence” or 
“negativity”, dis- solving contradictions rather than allowing their opposing elements to 
collide and explode into something new.  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